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Abstract
There is continuing interest in understanding factors that facilitate the evolution and stability of cooperation within and
between species. Such interactions will often involve plasticity in investment behavior, in response to the interacting
partner’s investments. Our aim here is to investigate the evolution and stability of reciprocal investment behavior in
interspecific interactions, a key phenomenon strongly supported by experimental observations. In particular, we present a
comprehensive analysis of a continuous reciprocal investment game between mutualists, both in well-mixed and spatially
structured populations, and we demonstrate a series of novel mechanisms for maintaining interspecific mutualism. We
demonstrate that mutualistic partners invariably follow investment cycles, during which mutualism first increases, before
both partners eventually reduce their investments to zero, so that these cycles always conclude with full defection. We show
that the key mechanism for stabilizing mutualism is phase polymorphism along the investment cycle. Although mutualistic
partners perpetually change their strategies, the community-level distribution of investment levels becomes stationary. In
spatially structured populations, the maintenance of polymorphism is further facilitated by dynamic mosaic structures, in
which mutualistic partners form expanding and collapsing spatial bubbles or clusters. Additionally, we reveal strategy-
diversity thresholds, both for well-mixed and spatially structured mutualistic communities, and discuss factors for meeting
these thresholds, and thus maintaining mutualism. Our results demonstrate that interspecific mutualism, when considered
as plastic investment behavior, can be unstable, and, in agreement with empirical observations, may involve a
polymorphism of investment levels, varying both in space and in time. Identifying the mechanisms maintaining such
polymorphism, and hence mutualism in natural communities, provides a significant step towards understanding the
coevolution and population dynamics of mutualistic interactions.
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Introduction
Investigating factors that promote cooperation is one of the
main topics in evolutionary biology [1,2]. Cooperation, a costly act
that provides benefit for a partner [3,4], is widespread in nature
[5–7] and has been essential in shaping our biosphere [8,9].
The basic dilemma of intraspecific cooperation [10] also applies
to interspecific mutualism [2,5]: while both partners of such
interactions would be better off helping each other, a cheater that
accepts help without reciprocating will have higher fitness and thus
spread in the population [11–14]. Cheating consistently commit-
ted by one partner can shift a mutualistic interaction into
parasitism [15], as corroborated by observations in ant–plant
mutualisms [16–18] or mycorrhizal mutualisms [19,20].
Despite the underlying dilemma being similar, interspecific
cooperation differs from intraspecific cooperation in several key
features. In interspecific cooperation, the interaction is under the
control of two separate genomes, the evolutionary success of
strategies in one species directly depends on the strategies in its
partner species [21,22] rather than on those on its own species,
and the spread of a successful strategy in one species does not
automatically result in the spread of a matching strategy in the
other. Another consequence of partners belonging to different
species is that one important mechanism promoting cooperation,
kin selection [1,2], cannot play a role. Furthermore, in many
mutualisms, the partners occupy different niches [5], and are thus
not in direct competition with each other. For all these reasons,
models of intraspecific cooperation do not cover the specificities of
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mutualisms, so that mechanisms promoting mutualism have to be
explored and identified separately [14,22].
Knowing the costs and benefits of a mutualistic interaction is
fundamental for understanding its ecology and evolution [13,23].
Commonly studied examples are nutritional mutualisms, such as
mycorrhiza [24–26] or rhizobia [27], and other forms of
symbiosis, including endosymbiosis [9]. However, these interac-
tions are often not described by a single discrete event, but involve
the long-term, often continuous, exchange of goods (such as in
rhizobia–plant interactions) [28,29]. Quantifying the effective costs
and benefits of these recurrent, and often reactive or conditional,
exchanges is more complicated. For example, experiments found
that the volume of nitrogen-containing substances provided by the
nitrogen-fixing bacteria (such as ammonium, aspartate, or alanine)
is increased by the concentration of oxygen and carbohydrates
(such as succinate or glutamate) provided and controlled by the
host plant [30,31]. In turn, from the perspective of the plant,
higher nitrogen supply via fixation can enhance plant metabolism
[27,32], which can translate into higher carbohydrate supply to
the symbiont [28]. Many studies have revealed similar mecha-
nisms for the conditional exchange of nutrients (such as
phosphates and carbohydrates) in mycorrhizal symbiosis [19,33–
35]. Such long-term (even lifelong) associations allow partners
continuously to adjust their investments into the mutualistic
interaction [36]. Individuals may increase or decrease rewards in
response to increased or decreased services received from a
partner [18,28,34,37–39]. This iterative reciprocation throughout
an interaction obviously involves phenotypic plasticity of the traits
involved in the interaction [40,41] and offers a control mechanism
between the partners [42]. Akin to reaction norms, which describe
how the environment can affect a genotype’s expression [41], the
rule of reciprocation can be described by an interaction norm [40],
which thus characterizes the expression of a trait as a function of
the interacting partner’s strategy.
In spite of the biological importance of, and the wealth of
information available for, interspecific cooperation, the evolution-
ary dynamics of mutualism are far less understood [13,14].
Moreover, among models of mutualism, few concentrate on the
evolutionary dynamics of interactions on the individual level when
there is continuous feedback between the partners [42], as
captured by the concept of partner fidelity feedback [1,11]. One
of the few existing models addressing this challenge is the one
proposed by Doebeli and Knowlton [43], which is among the
three most cited evolutionary models in the mutualism literature
(along with biological market models [44]; and models of
geographic mosaic theory of coevolution [45]). In their individ-
ual-based model, each individual’s strategy is characterized by two
values: the so-called initial offer and the reward rate. The initial
offer amounts to an unconditional or fixed investment in the
mutualistic interaction, whereas the reward rate quantifies a
conditional or variable component, which determines how an
individual’s investment depends on the payoff it gained from its
current partner in the previous round. This distinction is well
founded in the biology of mutualistic interactions. For example, in
mutualistic interactions involving ants defending their mutualistic
partners from predation, as in the case of ants and lycaenid
butterfly larvae [46] or aphids [14], both partners can adjust their
investments by providing less nectar or less tending. There is also
an unconditional initial investment in many interactions, which is
required for establishing an interaction with a partner before
evaluating its quality as a mutualist [14]. Examples include
honeydew droplets or volatile substances from tentacle organs to
attract partners [17] or chemical compounds released by plants in
mycorrhizal or rhizobial mutualisms [27]. Moreover, creating an
interface for physical contact sometimes requires high investments
from both parties before an exchange of nutrients can commence
[47].
Doebeli and Knowlton [43] concluded that population structure
or spatial confinement is essential for stabilizing mutualisms. They
elegantly demonstrated that without the facilitating effect of space,
mutualistic investments vanish from the populations. Nevertheless,
the specific role of spatial structure and the differences in the
dynamics of mutualism in spatially structured and well-mixed
populations need to be still more deeply understood. Moreover,
Doebeli and Knowlton’s conclusion regarding the necessity of
spatial population structure was based on a single example.
Reviews of the mutualism literature [13,14,38] have therefore
debated the importance of space in stabilizing mutualism, and
independent theoretical studies [37] could not corroborate the
necessity of space for stabilizing mutualism. What are the causes
for this apparent discrepancy? Are mutualisms really unstable in
the absence of spatial structure? Our aim here is to unravel the
role of space in the evolutionary dynamics of mutualism and to
provide a platform for connecting model results with experimental
findings.
Methods
Throughout this study, we closely follow the seminal model
introduced by Doebeli and Knowlton [43]. We define mutualism
as an interaction between individuals from different species,
Mutualist A and Mutualist B. We highlight that Mutualist A and
Mutualist B in our model can, more generally, be interpreted as
mutualist guilds: such guilds are composed of one species or
several species that share the same functional relationship with the
other guild. The fitness of an individual depends on the outcome
of its interaction with a member of the other mutualist guild, while
competition occurs only between members of the same guild.
Modeling the latter as competition for space, the populations of
the two mutualist guilds can be conceived as occupying two
separate square lattices. We do not consider sexual reproduction,
Author Summary
Mutualistic interactions between species are often best
understood as gradually adjustable reciprocal investments
made continuously or iteratively between participants.
Prime examples are the mycorrhizal and rhizobial mutu-
alisms so strongly affecting the productivity of plants.
When such interactions are described by continuous
reciprocal investment games, participants adjust their
investments plastically in response to their mutualistic
partner’s most recent investment. Although common
sense suggests that such conditional or reactive behavior
provides a potent defense against exploitation, our
comprehensive model analysis reveals that the coevolu-
tion of investment strategies will often instead induce
instability and decay of mutualistic interactions. We also
identify several factors that can prevent this decay. First,
mutualisms can be stably maintained if the investment
strategies of participants are sufficiently diverse. Second, if
participants are limited in their movements, the formation
of dynamic spatial mosaic structures promotes strategy
diversity and thereby facilitates the maintenance of
mutualism. These ecological and evolutionary dynamics
result in communities with a diversity of interaction types,
ranging from mutually beneficial to exploitative, and
varying both in space and in time.
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and the only characteristics of individuals we examine are the
traits affecting their mutualistic investments, as detailed below.
Mutualistic investments
Each individual’s strategy for interacting with individuals from
the other guild is specified by two (non-negative) quantitative
adaptive traits: an unconditional investment a, determining the
initial offer to be made to a partner, and a conditional investment
b, determining the reward rate according to which investment
received from a partner are reciprocated. Thus, the strategy of
Mutualist A is given by the pair (aA,bA), and the strategy of
Mutualist B is given by the pair (aB,bB). The initial offer is an
unconditional and fixed investment into the mutualistic interac-
tion, whereas the reward rate determines how the investment
changes depending on the last payoff gained from the interaction
with the current partner.
Interactions and payoffs
Payoffs are calculated through an iterative procedure, based on
a fixed number T of iterations, or interaction rounds. Following
Doebeli and Knowlton [43], we use T~15 rounds. Before the first
iteration, the payoffs of all individuals are set to zero. Below we
consider the investments made, costs incurred, benefits received,
and payoffs accrued by a mutualist with strategy i interacting with
a mutualist with strategy j. In the first iteration t~0, the
investment I1,i,j is simply given by the trait a, I1,i,j~ai. In every
subsequent iteration tw0, the investment It is determined by a
linear reactive strategy,
It,i,j~aizbipt{1,i,j ,
where pt{1,i,j is the net benefit, or payoff, obtained in the previous
iteration t{1 by strategy i interacting with strategy j (see below for
further details on how partners are chosen). Investments It,i,j are
always non-negative: if they would be negative, they are set to
zero.
The payoffs are calculated from the investments made by the
individuals of Mutualist A and Mutualist B. Each investment
implies a cost for the donor and a benefit for the receiver,
C(It,i,j)~C0It,i,j ,
B(It,j,i)~B0½1{exp({B1It,j,i):
Accordingly, the payoff from one iteration of the interaction is
pt,i,j~B(It,j,i){C(It,i,j),
where It,i,j and It,j,i, respectively, are the investments of the focal
individual i and of its partner j in round t [43]. Total payoffs are
obtained by summing payoffs over all rounds of the mutualistic
interaction, Pi,j~
PT
t~1 pt,i,j .
Benefit-to-cost relationship
Compared to traditional game theoretical models, for which the
benefit-to-cost ratio is given by b=c (benefit divided by the cost of
cooperation), for the current model, it is much harder to define the
benefit-to-cost relationship, because of the nonlinear benefit
function and the complex iterated nature of the game. It is
therefore helpful to examine an approximation for infinitesimally
small investments: in this case, the benefit function simplifies to
B(I){?
I?0
B0B1I . We can then consider the benefit-to-cost ratio
B(I)=C(I) in this limit, which gives (B0B1I)=(C0I)~B0B1=C0.
This simple expression serves as an upper bound: for higher
investments, the nonlinearity of benefits causes the benefit-to-cost
ratio always to fall below B0B1=C0. Hence, for our model, a
higher benefit-to-cost ratio means a higher product of the two
parameter values for the benefit function compared to the
parameter value for the cost function.
Competition
In the spatial model, the focal individual and its m closest
neighbors (we use the Moore neighborhood with m~8) compete
for the focal site. In the well-mixed model, we randomly draw as
competitors m individuals from the focal individual’s whole
population. We employ either of two update rules. With ‘‘best
takes over’’ updating, which was also used by Doebeli and
Knowlton [43], the individual with the highest payoff replaces the
focal individual [43,48,49]. This implies that, if no competitor has
a higher payoff than the focal individual, the later stays
unchanged. If two individuals have the same payoffs, the winner
is randomly chosen between them. With ‘‘pairwise comparison’’
updating, a random competitor i (interacting with individual j)
replaces the focal individual k (interacting with individual l) with
probability 1=½1zexp({wDP), depending on their payoff
difference DP~Pi,j{Pk,l [50,51]; for scaling the strength of
selection, we use w~1. Both rules belong to the class of so-called
death–birth updating processes [51].
Mutation
The two traits can mutate independently with probability m per
update. The mutant trait value is drawn from a normal
distribution, with a mean equaling the current trait value and a
given variance. Doebeli and Knowlton [43] assumed that the
standard deviation s of this normal distribution is a given
percentage (5%) of the current trait value. This assumption
implies that the coefficient of variation (CV ) is constant; thus, for
smaller trait values the resultant variance is smaller than for larger
trait values. Accordingly, when a trait value approaches 0, its
mutational variance also approaches 0. This means that trait
values can essentially get ‘‘stuck’’ close to 0. To evaluate the
consequences of this effect, we also consider models in which the
mutational standard deviation is kept fixed (s~0:05).
Updating
In our model, N2 updates occur per generation, where N2 is the
population of Mutualist A and Mutualist B. In the spatial model,
N is the width and height of the square lattice (we consider values
N~10, 30, 50, and 100). For each update, we choose an
interacting pair of Mutualist A and B. In the spatial model, the
chosen individuals that occupy matching sites on the two lattices,
whereas in the well-mixed model, they are randomly drawn from
the two lattices. With synchronous updating, all individuals are
updated at once, while with asynchronous updating, randomly
chosen individuals are updated. Unless mentioned otherwise, we
use asynchronous updating. Each update starts with an update of
the payoffs of the involved individuals, followed by competition
among them.
We initialize the model dynamics with two homogeneous
populations with both trait values close to 0 (0:005, unless
indicated otherwise), implying that individuals are not mutualistic.
We also consider different initial conditions, with one or both of
the traits set to higher values (chosen from the interval 0{10). We
then run the dynamics for 100,000 generations (unless otherwise
Mutualism with Investment Cycles and Polymorphism
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indicated), which is a time horizon chosen to be long enough to
detect the main dynamical trends for all considered model settings.
Results
As the dynamics of the full model are highly complex, we
gradually build up understanding by analyzing model versions of
increasing complexity throughout the next five sections, starting
with the simplest model version that still retains key dynamical
features of the full model, and after five steps eventually arriving
back at the full model. Based on the payoffs defined above, we
start from a best-response analysis of the mutualistic investment
strategies; we then examine the selection pressures on these
investments for mutualists with low polymorphism, consider the
individual-based model without spatial population structure but
with higher degrees of polymorphism, reinstate the spatial
population structure, and finally conclude our analysis of the full
model by exploring the effects of different mutation schemes and
update rules. The insights gained through this five-step investiga-
tion allow us to revisit and reinterpret the results by Doebeli and
Knowlton [43] at the conclusion of this section.
No investment as a best-response equilibrium
As a first step, we determine best-response equilibria of the
mutualistic investments. The interspecific best response sj~r(si) is
defined here as the strategy sj of mutualist j that has the highest
payoff playing against strategy si in the other mutualist guild, for
i,j~A,B, i=j. Thus, investment strategies are in a best-response
equilibrium (sA,sB), if r(sA)~sB and r(sB)~sA, if, that is, these
strategies are the best responses to each other. Incidentally, this
implies r(r(sA))~sA, which highlights a similarity with the concept
of Nash equilibrium in intraspecific games; in that case, a strategy
simply is the best response to itself [52].
As an analytical derivation of the best-response function r is not
possible for our model, we calculate it numerically by fixing a
strategy sA for Mutualist A, and then scan the two-dimensional
strategy space of Mutualist B for the strategy r(sA)~sB that yields
the highest payoff to Mutualist B. We find that the best response to
no investment is no investment, r(0,0)~(0,0), which therefore is a
best-response equilibrium. The intuitive explanation is simple:
when a partner does not reciprocate, the best strategy is not to
invest in that partner. Furthermore, as our numerical investiga-
tions reveal, ((0,0),(0,0)), i.e., no investment by both mutualists
(aA~0, bA~0, aB~0, and bB~0), is the only best-response
equilibrium of our model.
Analyzing the local stability around this equilibrium, we find
two types of local best-response dynamics. The equilibrium
((0,0),(0,0)) is locally stable [53], but strategies converge there
only if they start out below a threshold level bT of reciprocation
(gray lines in Figure 1A and B). Using the same approximation as
Killingback and Doebeli [54] for small investments, we find that
this threshold is determined by the slopes of the benefit and cost
functions at zero investment, bT~C’(0)=½B’(0)2{C’(0)2 [53,54],
with B’(0)~B0B1 and C’(0)~C0 for our model. Thus, when
starting out below bT, best-response strategies converge to the no-
investment equilibrium, whereas when strategies start out above
bT, best responses lead to an increase in investment levels.
To understand the latter behavior, we consider the global best-
response dynamics, which gives us full information about the
coevolutionary changes we must expect in mutualistic investment
strategies. For this, we start from the initial strategy of one
mutualist, determine the optimal strategy of its partner, then again
determine the optimal strategy of the first mutualist, and so on
(Figure 1A). Interestingly, this shows that the no-investment
strategy is not always the best response: above the thick gray line
in Figure 1A, the best response differs from (0,0) and causes
reciprocation to increase in the first step (Figure 1A). After a few
best-response steps, however, the dynamics always converge to the
no-investment equilibrium, which is thus a global attractor of the
best-response dynamics.
In conclusion, when the best-response dynamics start out below
the threshold line, these dynamics will directly lead to the no-
investment equilibrium, whereas when the initial strategies lie
above the threshold line, the best-response dynamics will cause
investments to increase temporarily, before bringing them down to
0 eventually (Figure 1A). Throughout this study, we refer to the
latter behavior as the investment cycle.
Investment cycle and selection pressures on mutualistic
investments
We now show how our insights from the best-response analysis
above extend to individual-based evolutionary dynamics under
low degrees of polymorphism (Figure 1B, C). We find that when
started below a threshold line (thick gray line in Figure 1B), the
evolutionary dynamics monotonically converge to no investment.
Above that line, the evolutionary dynamics temporarily drive
investments up (Figure 1B and C). After these investments have
passed a maximum, they monotonically converge to zero. In other
words, we again find a ‘‘boom and bust’’ kind of investment cycle.
We can obtain the threshold of increasing investments (thick
gray line in Figure 1B) in the limit of vanishing polymorphism. In
Figure 1. Illustration of investment cycle and reciprocation
threshold in well-mixed communities. (A) Best-response dynamics.
Arrows indicate the succession of best responses, leading to
(a,b)~(0,0) in just four steps. (B) Evolutionary dynamics in a community
with low degrees of polymorphism and ‘‘pairwise comparison’’
updating. Arrows indicate changes of the selection gradient along
the investment cycle. In A and B, representative evolutionary
trajectories are shown starting above the reciprocation threshold (thick
gray lines). (C) Resultant changes of investment traits and payoffs along
the investment cycle in B. Results in B and C are averaged over 15
replicate model runs for the same initial condition. Parameters:
N2~100, T~15, B0~4:7, B1~1:8, C0~0:6, s~0:005, and m~0:005.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002660.g001
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that case, the selection pressures on the investment traits are given
by gX ,x(xX )~LPi,j=Lx’X Dx’X~xX , where X is the focal mutualist (A
or B), Y is the other mutualist (B or A, respectively), x is the focal
trait (a or b), i~(a’X ,b’X ) is the strategy of a mutant in X , (aX ,bX )
is the resident strategy in X , and j~(aY ,bY ) is the resident
strategy in Y . Positive selection pressures mean that mutants with
increased trait values have higher payoffs than the current
resident, and therefore can spread in the population. This kind
of evolutionary dynamics is still simplified compared with an
individual-based model; it yields good approximations only when
population dynamics are sufficiently faster than trait dynamics
(m%1), so mutants mostly encounter monomorphic populations,
and when mutational steps are sufficiently small (s%1), so the
derivatives defining the selection pressures carry sufficient
information for predicting the fate of all arising mutants. The
obtained threshold line (thick gray line in Figure 1B) is the unstable
part of the evolutionary isocline for trait b, along which the
selection pressure on b passes 0 and thus changes sign. For small
investments, and thus for a?0, this isocline is located at b~bT.
We find that our aforementioned results regarding the
investment cycle are robust. First, we can approximate the
underlying individual-based evolutionary dynamics by adaptive
dynamics theory [55], using the selection pressures gX ,x defined
above. For low mutation probabilities m and standard deviations s,
this approximation is accurate. Second, we can consider ‘‘best
takes over’’ updating in an individual-based model with low
degrees of polymorphism, and third, we can use a modification of
this updating, so that the most successful mutant is drawn from a
circle around the resident traits (for this, we sample random
combinations of mutants from a circle of radius 0:005
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Da2zDb2
p
,
where Da and Db denote the trait differences between mutants and
residents, and choose the one mutant with the highest payoff). All
three of these variants yield results in agreement with those
summarized above.
The emergence of the investment cycle can best be understood
by examining the gradual coevolution of the two investment traits.
Evolution starts from a slightly reactive state (b exceeds the
threshold bT), and both the unconditional and conditional
investments first increase, as selection pressures are positive on
both traits. Higher reactivity (resulting from higher conditional
investment b) selects for a higher initial investment a, because
making a high initial investment then yields high returns already
from the first round of the interaction; consequently, individuals
obtain higher payoffs by making high investments already from the
beginning of the interaction. While the initial investment increases,
the selection pressure for the conditional response decreases and
finally reverses, as a strategy investing a large amount in the
beginning and increasing investments even further in the following
rounds may end up overinvesting. Eventually, after the reactivity b
evolves close to 0 (falling below bT), the initial investments a also
evolve to 0. In this final phase, with very little reactivity, the
dynamics simply resemble those of the continuous prisoner’s
dilemma, in which no cooperative investments can be maintained
without additional mechanisms.
Phases of the investment cycle
Next, we introduce a measure that helps us monitor the
evolution of strategies along the investment cycle, and that suitably
reduces the two-dimensional trait space, spanned by the two
investment traits, to one dimension. For this purpose, we define
cycle phases, QA and QB for Mutualist A and B, respectively, so
that these monotonically increase along the investment cycle. As
shown by the small arrows in Figure 1B, these phases are
determined by the direction of the selection gradients (gX ,a,gX ,b)
acting on the traits (aX , bX ) of Mutualist X with X~A,B.
Depending on the signs of gX ,a and gX ,b, we can distinguish four
quadrants of QX , measured clockwise relative to the positive
vertical axis. In the first quadrant, QX~arctan(gX ,a=gX ,b); in the
second quadrant, QX~{arctan(gX ,b=gX ,a)zp=2; in the third
quadrant, QX~arctan(gX ,a=gX ,b)zp; and in the fourth quadrant,
QX~{arctan(gX ,b=gX ,a)z3p=2. The boundaries between these
phases thus correspond to evolutionary isoclines, i.e., to curves in
the trait space along which the selection pressure vanishes for
either one of the two traits.
Phase I is characterized by positive selection pressures on a and
b, so that both trait values and investment levels increase (phase I
in Figure 1B and 1C, 0ƒQvp=2). In phase II, while trait a still
increases, trait b declines, as the selection pressure on b is negative
(phase II in Figure 1B and 1C, p=2ƒQvp). In phase III, more
exploitative strategies, which invest less and thus gain more, are
favored by selection, so that investment levels evolve to 0, as traits
a and b both decline (phase III in Figure 1B and C, pƒQv3p=2).
For low degrees of polymorphism, selection gradients in the fourth
quadrant rarely occur; here, trait b would grow while trait a would
shrink (3p=2ƒQv2p).
Figure 1 shows that the cycle phase derived from the selection
gradients acting on Mutualists A and B adequately indicates the
direction of evolutionary dynamics along the investment cycle, in
monomorphic populations or in populations with a low degree of
polymorphism.
Phase polymorphism
In the next step of our analysis, we allow higher degrees of
polymorphism. As shown in the previous section, when mutation
probability and/or mutation variance are low, the polymorphic
spread among strategies remains narrow, as the two mutualist
communities evolve along the investment cycle (Figure 2A, left-
hand side). However, there is a sharp transition in the outcome as
the variety of mutants increases. Above a critical supply of strategy
diversity, the two polymorphic populations can perpetually
maintain strategies that on average are mutualistic and that lead
to a high and stable level of average payoff (Figure 2A, right-hand
side). This stable community-level mutualism still implies cyclic
behavior, as the averages of both investment traits gradually evolve
along the investment cycle also in populations with higher degrees
of polymorphism (Figure 2B–D). Importantly, however, with the
increase of mutational variability, this cyclic behavior becomes
perpetual, as the evolutionary dynamics no longer collapse to zero
investments at the end of phase III. The increase of mutational
variance not only affects the polymorphic spread of strategies
along the investment cycle, but also its shape and amplitude
(observe the decrease of cycle amplitude with the increase of s in
Figure 2B–D). To understand these effects of mutational variabil-
ity, we need to appreciate, first, how and why polymorphism
arises, and second, what it implies for the community-level stability
of mutualistic interactions. For this, it is helpful again to consider
phases and selection gradients along the investment cycle.
Individuals in polymorphic populations encounter a diverse set
of strategies, so the selection gradients they experience need to be
determined accordingly: gi,x(xi)~L 1J
PJ
j~1
Pi,j
 !,
Lx’i Dx’i~xi ,
where i is the focal individual, the sum extends over all individuals
j of the other mutualist, and the parenthesis encloses the expected
payoff of a mutant offspring of individual i with strategy (a’i,b’i).
These selection gradients, shown as arrows in Figure 3A, help us
understand the emergence of cyclic dynamics and phase
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polymorphism. At the beginning of the investment cycle (phase I),
mutations will typically cause some symmetry breaking between
the investment strategies of the two mutualists, while the
polymorphic spread among strategies still remains narrow
(Figure 3A, Panel 1). Once a trajectory reaches phase II, the
selection pressures on the two b traits approach 0, making them
especially susceptible to neutral drift, and thus enhancing the
symmetry breaking and polymorphic spread (observe the diversity
of gradient angles in Figure 3A, Panel 2). Similar mechanisms
operate at the boundary between phases II and III, where selection
pressures become weak on the a traits (Figure 3A, Panels 3 and 4).
Finally, when a trajectory reaches phase III (Figure 3A, Panel 5),
the strongest effect occurs: when traits evolve close to the
boundary that separates trait combinations corresponding to
phases III and I (see the partially overlapping black and thick gray
lines in Figure 1B), mutations can take the two traits across the
boundary, from phase III to I and back. Such a jump across the
boundary changes the sign of the selection gradient for both of the
traits for at least one of the mutualists (Figure 3A, Panels 6 and 1).
This causes recurrent transitions across the boundary, so
trajectories linger at this boundary, which naturally increases their
polymorphic spread. Once a sufficient proportion of the popula-
tion has thus traversed the boundary, the investment cycle is
retriggered (Figure 3A, Panel 1). Notice that the degree of phase
polymorphism varies along the investment cycle. It typically
decreases in the middle of phases I and III (observe how all
gradients are pointing in essentially just one direction in Figure 3A,
Panels 1 and 5), and increases at the boundaries between the
phases (observe the diversity of gradient angles in Figure 3A,
Panels 2, 3, 4, 6).
With further increases of mutational variability, even higher
levels of polymorphism develop, so strategies diffuse across all
phases of the investment cycle. In highly polymorphic populations,
as a consequence of this phase spread, selection pressures become
widely different for different parts of the populations; hence, a
wide variety of strategies becomes established, ranging all the way
from phase I to phase IV (Figure 3B). Competition between
strategies and strategy pairs shapes the phase distribution of the
Figure 2. Evolution and stability of mutualistic investments in
communities with higher degrees of polymorphism. (A) Diversity
thresholds revealed by the effect of mutational variability on the
average payoff in the community. For lower mutational standard
deviations s, there is no mutualism (left-hand side), while stable
community-level mutualism evolves abruptly once mutational variabil-
ity is high enough (right-hand side). Results are averaged over the two
mutualists and 15 replicate model runs. Payoffs can range between 0
and the maximal potential payoff Pmax~TB0 . (B, C, D) Polymorphic
spread of strategies in well-mixed communities, and their evolution
along the investment cycle, with low, medium, or high mutational
standard deviations: s~0:0075 in B, s~0:025 in C, and s~0:1 in D. As
the averages of the traits a and bmove along the investment cycle, they
trace out the shown circular lines, corresponding to cyclic oscillations
whose amplitudes decrease as s increases. Other parameters:
N2~10,000 in A and N2~2,500 in B, C, and D; lower benefit-to-cost
ratio of 14:1 in A: B0~4:7, B1~1:8, C0~0:6; higher benefit-to-cost ratio
of 175 in A, B, C, and D: B0~7, B1~2:5, C0~0:1; T~15, m~0:02.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002660.g002
Figure 3. Selection gradients along the investment cycle and
resultant phase distribution in a well-mixed polymorphic
community. (A) Arrows indicate the selection gradients on a random
subsample of individuals of Mutualist A as that mutualist’s trait
distribution (gray dots) moves along the investment cycle (gray circular
lines). Average long-term polymorphic distribution of (B) phases along
the investment cycle and (C) corresponding phase asymmetries during
the evolution of mutualistic investments, averaged over three replicate
model runs and shown on logarithmic scales. The phase asymmetry in
pairs of interacting individuals of Mutualist A and B is measured as the
difference of their phases, QA{QB. The peaks at 0 and p in B
correspond, respectively, to the vertical and horizontal edges of the
investment cycle. Parameters: N2~900 in A and N2~2,500 in B and C;
s~0:025 in A and s~0:05 in B and C; T~15, B0~7, B1~2:5, C0~0:1,
and m~0:02.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002660.g003
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community (Figure 3B and C), as individuals or pairs with a
competitive disadvantage fade out from the community. These
losing strategies are typically those at the beginning of phase I or at
the end of phase III (Q&0 or Q&3p=2), as well as strategy pairs
with an extreme asymmetry or exploitation (at the tails of the
distribution in Figure 3C). The two most successful, and hence
most frequent strategies, are conditional cooperators (akin to Tit-
for-Tat strategies, with high b and low a; Figure 3B, peak close to
0) and unconditional cooperators (akin to All-C strategies, with
high a and low b; Figure 3B, peak close to p). The result of
competition within the polymorphic populations is thus a diverse
cast of interactions, ranging from strongly mutualistic (central peak
in Figure 3C, corresponding to both mutualists being in the same
phase) to exploitative (two lateral peaks in Figure 3C, correspond-
ing to one mutualist being in phase I and the other in phase III, or
vice versa).
We highlight that the results depicted in Figure 2A are
essentially invariant for lower mutation rates (not shown). The
intuitive explanation is that such lower mutation rates have two
effects. First, there are fewer mutations occurring in any given time
window, which by itself would hinder the retriggering of the
investment cycle. Second, the pace of directional evolution slows
down for such lower rates, so the trait distribution lingers for
longer periods at the phase boundaries, which by itself would
facilitate the retriggering of the investment cycle. These two effects
essentially cancel, leaving the critical levels of mutational
variability needed for retriggering the investment cycle largely
independent of the considered mutation rates. By contrast, this
retriggering is strongly affected by the benefit-to-cost ratio. When
the benefit-to-cost ratio is large, a smaller amount of mutational
variability suffices to maintain strategy polymorphism and thus
community-level mutualism (Figure 2A, compare upper and lower
pairs of curves). Moreover, localized interactions and limited
dispersal promote strategy polymorphism, by creating a spatial
mosaic structure, as we will describe in more detail in the next
section. Accordingly, in spatially structured populations the
transition to stable community-level mutualism appears at lower
mutational variability (Figure 2A, compare gray to black pairs of
curves).
Spatial bubbles and polymorphism
In spatially structured mutualistic communities with local
interactions and limited dispersal, strategy polymorphism occurs
together with a dynamic spatial mosaic structure (Figure 4A) of
spatially abutting ‘‘bubbles.’’ Here we use the term ‘‘bubble’’ to
describe spatial clusters that are compact and contiguous, contain
similar strategies on the inside and different ones on the outside
(Figure 4B), and grow gradually in size from a small core before
disappearing through a sudden collapse (Figure 4D). For the most
part, there is a strong correspondence between Mutualist A and
Mutualist B with regard to the position and extent of spatial
bubbles, and typically the corresponding strategies are asymmet-
ric, giving one species a higher payoff than the other (compare the
shading of corresponding sites in Figure 4A). To fully understand
the role of spatial population structure in stabilizing mutualism, we
thus have to understand the composition of, and the ongoing
dynamics among and within, these bubbles.
As we saw in the previous section, symmetry breaking and phase
polymorphism along the investment cycle can lead to asymmetry
between the mutualistic partners. This emerging asymmetry is
strongly exaggerated by the spatial bubble structure, as compet-
itively inferior strategies vanish quickly, while exploiting strategies
are likely to attempt an invasion of adjacent bubbles, supported by
their high payoffs. Hence, spatial bubbles are often composed of
exploiting strategies and their exploited partners. The degree of
asymmetry and its trend among bubbles can vary, and this
diversity of asymmetries provides the stage for bubbles expanding,
Figure 4. Spatial bubble dynamics and appearance of the insulating boundary layer. (A) Typical snapshot of the spatial mosaic structure,
indicating a high degree of polymorphism and spatial bubbles comprising different strategies. Each pixel represents an individual, rendered
according to its payoff between zero (light gray) and the maximal value (black). (B) Enlargement of a bubble with its surrounding insulating boundary
layer. Notice that individuals inside and outside the bubble both have higher payoffs than the individuals forming the boundary layer. This panel is
obtained as an overlay of Mutualist A and B from the third column in D according to their average payoff values. (C) Shading of background strategies
ranges from white to mid-gray, while shading for the focal bubble ranges from dark-gray to black, as the payoffs of individuals increase. (D) Time
series of snapshots for a spatial bubble (black to dark-gray shading) that first expands and then vanishes, illustrating a spatial ‘‘boom and bust’’ cycle
(snapshots are taken in generations 3013, 3040, 3260, 3399, 3493, 3625, 5165, 5620, 6400, and 6408). Parameters: N2~2,500 in A and N2~900 in D;
T~15, B0~7, B1~2:5, C0~0:1, CV~0:05, and m~0:02.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002660.g004
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splitting, or collapsing in various ways (Figure 5). If a strategy can
outcompete that of a neighboring strategy, its successful invasion
further depends on its maintaining its competitive superiority in
the invaded patch. Hence, invasion success can be determined by
considering the relative payoff of the invader before and after
invasion.
To demonstrate this, we consider the interface between two
bubbles as the site where strategy pairs can meet. We can then
analyze all possible dynamics at this interface. We label the two
bubbles so that Mutualist A has a higher payoff (.) in bubble 1
than in bubble 2. We can neglect cases with equal payoffs in the
two bubbles, as these do not change the configuration of strategies,
and thus do not contribute to the bubble dynamics. Relations
between the payoffs in bubble 1, at the interface, and in bubble 2
(Figure 5) can thus be represented as , , , or for
Mutualist A, and by , , , or for Mutualist B, yielding
seven distinct situations: , , , , , , .
Corresponding to Figure 5, the upper row in these stacked
symbols refers to Mutualist A and the lower row to Mutualist B,
while the first column refers to the payoff comparison between
bubble 1 and the interface, and the second column to the interface
and bubble 2. The first four cases, in which Mutualist A in bubble
1 always has a higher fitness than Mutualist A at the interface
( ), correspond to replacement dynamics (Figure 5A–D) involv-
ing unidirectional invasion (Figure 5A), partner swapping
(Figure 5B), catalyzed invasion (Figure 5C), and coexistence of
the two bubbles (Figure 5D). In the last three cases, Mutualist A
has a higher payoff at the interface than in either bubble ( ). We
can interpret these situations as having a bubble with a strategy
pair formed at the interface that can spread in both directions. The
resultant new pairs of adjacent bubbles will then behave in one of
the ways covered by the first four cases above. Thus, the four cases
shown in Figure 5A–D and discussed in more detail in that figure’s
caption cover all possible dynamics between the two bubbles.
The most relevant case for preserving phase polymorphism
occurs when the two exploiting strategies of two adjacent bubbles,
having high payoffs within their bubble, can both enter the
intervening interface, but their exploited partners cannot
(Figure 5D). Then, these exploiting strategies meet at the interface,
but are mismatched: by interacting with each other, they
experience lower payoffs compared to when they interact with
their original partners. Consequently, neither bubble can invade
the other (under deterministic updating), and an insulating
boundary layer forms between them (Figure 5D). These effects
yield a relatively static mosaic structure, in which most bubbles are
separated by insulating boundary layers, which in turn fosters the
long-term coexistence of a diverse set of strategies in both
mutualist guilds. Nevertheless, the resulting mosaics are eventually
not immune to the degradation of mutualism within bubbles, as
strategy pairs evolve along the investment cycle, making the
mosaic structure (if only slowly) dynamic.
The dynamics of the spatial mosaic are governed by evolution-
ary processes that maintain a balance between the expansion or
emergence and the contraction or collapse of bubbles. First of all,
inside a bubble, evolution drives strategies through the investment
cycle. Sooner or later, this stochastic evolution changes the
strategy pairs of two neighboring bubbles in such a way that their
boundary layer (Figure 5E, gray area) loses its insulating property,
thus enabling invasion from one bubble to the other (Figure 5E,
white or black areas). Although this invasion itself is a rapid
process, the evolutionary time that is required for the insulating
boundary layer to break down is usually long. Counteracting
mechanisms can restore the loss of diversity resulting from bubble
collapse: this happens through the emergence of new bubbles as a
result of successfully established mutations (if such a mutant
conquers only part of a bubble) or through the fragmentation of
existing bubbles. In the latter case, mutants occurring within the
insulating boundary layer are able to invade either one of the
adjacent bubbles. Through this invasion, the mutant opens up the
boundary and can catalyze the invasion of strategies from the
neighboring bubble (similar to how Mutualist A1 catalyzes the
invasion of B1, as in Figure 5C). Thus, while the two neighboring
bubbles could originally not invade each other, this becomes
possible through the mutant serving as a ‘‘third party.’’ The
resultant expansion of the invading bubble can then split the
invaded bubble (Figure 4D, from fifth the column onwards), upon
which the two resultant parts can take separate evolutionary paths.
In summary, strategy diversity, and thus, community-level
mutualism, is efficiently stabilized through the formation of an
insulating boundary layer between bubbles of strategies. This
would result in a static mosaic structure, which, however, becomes
Figure 5. Possible replacement dynamics at the interface
between two spatial bubbles. We presume that strategy pairs meet
at the interface (white columns) of bubble 1 (dark-gray columns) and
bubble 2 (light-gray columns). Here, the following cases can occur: (A)
Unidirectional invasion: both mutualists from bubble 1 invade the other
bubble, as both A1 and B1 have a higher payoff than A2 and B2. (B)
Partner swapping: A1 has a higher payoff and outcompetes A2, but B2
has a higher payoff and outcompetes B1, hence A1 pairs up with B2. (C)
Catalyzed invasion: only A1 is able to outcompete its competitor from
bubble 2, but as it spreads, it makes it possible for B1 to follow. This is
feasible because B2 fares worse with A1 than with A2, so as A1 spreads,
the payoff of B2 decreases with its new partner, and hence B1 can now
invade. (D) Insulating boundary layer: at the interface of two spatial
bubbles, the originally competitively superior strategies A1 and B2
enter the interface, but as both then have a lower payoff than with their
original partners, neither can spread further. Column heights depict the
payoffs of strategies. For the described dynamics, the payoffs of a
strategy with its two possible partners (i.e., from either bubble 1 or 2) at
the interface must lie within the interval indicated by the two whiskers
in the middle column. (E) Invasion dynamics depend on the strategy
compositions of the mutualist pairs. Formation of an insulating
boundary layer is the result of the encounter of two strategy pairs
(A1&B1, A2&B2) that are mutually unable to invade each other (gray
area). Otherwise, one bubble invades and replaces the other (in the
white area, the strategy pair of bubble 1 wins, whereas in the black
area, the strategy pair of bubble 2 wins). We evaluate these outcomes in
the absence of evolution (no mutations) and for one strategy pair
(A1&B1) initially occupying one half of the lattice and the other strategy
pair (A2&B2) occupying the other half. Parameters: A1 and B1, a~0:1
and b~0:01; A2, a~0:1 and b~0:1; B2, a[½0:001,1 and b[½0:001,1;
T~15, N2~900, B0~7, B1~2:5, and C0~0:1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002660.g005
Mutualism with Investment Cycles and Polymorphism
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 8 November 2012 | Volume 8 | Issue 11 | e1002660
dynamic as strategies evolve along the investment cycle. The
invasions resulting from these stochastic evolutionary processes
establish a balance between the emergence and collapse of bubbles
that maintains a level of polymorphism in a more efficient way
than the corresponding well-mixed mutualistic community. The
diversity threshold for community-level mutualism is thus more
easily passed in spatially structured communities (Figure 2A).
Extended analysis of the Doebeli-Knowlton model
In the light of our understanding of the evolution and stability of
interspecific cooperative investments established in the previous
sections, we can now revisit, complement, and extend the
pioneering investigation of Doebeli and Knowlton (DK) [43].
Specifically, we can present a more comprehensive and
systematic overview of the evolution of interspecific cooperative
investments under various relevant conditions (Figure 6). First, we
present the necessary condition that no mutualistic investments
can evolve below B0B1=C0v1, that is, when the benefit-to-cost
ratio falls below 1 and mutualism is thus not advantageous (see
thin black lines with white background in Figure 6), which in
general holds under all conditions. Also, the transition to high
stable levels of mutualistic investments is sharper for higher
benefit-to-cost ratio (rows with B0~10 in Figure 6). Second,
besides the synchronous updating that was originally applied by
DK in the spatial model, we also consider asynchronous updating,
and find that mutualism is unstable for a wider range of benefit-to-
cost ratios (compare third and fourth columns in Figure 6). Third,
we test different competition rules under asynchronous updating,
such as the pairwise comparison rule instead of the best-takes-over
rule used by DK, and we can conclude that outcomes are
essentially unaffected by these different rules (not shown). Fourth,
we consider two methods for generating mutant traits. In one
version, as in the original DK model, we draw the trait values of
mutants with a constant coefficient of variation, so that the
mutational standard deviation linearly increases with the current
trait value (row labeled ‘‘CV constant’’ in Figure 6). With this
approach, mutational variance for small trait values becomes very
low, equaling 0 when trait values equal 0. Here we examine a
different assumption, according to which mutational variance is
constant for all trait values (rows labeled ‘‘s constant’’ in Figure 6).
Comparing the results, we arrive at an important conclusion,
namely, that the qualitative contrast reported by DK between
Figure 6. Average payoff as a function of the parameters of the cost and benefit functions, spatial structure, and update rules. Each
individual panel shows the average payoff of Mutualist A and Mutualist B, calculated as the arithmetic mean of their payoffs over the last 1,000
generations, out of the total of 100,000 generations, and averaged over five replicate model runs. The three parameters of the benefit and cost
functions are varied as follows: B1 and C0 along the axes and B0 between the upper (B0~3) and lower (B0~10) eight panels. The black line on white
background indicates the B0B1=C0~1 threshold, below which no investments can evolve. Results for well-mixed populations are shown in the eight
panels on the left, while results for spatially structured populations are shown in the eight panels on the right. Odd and even columns correspond to
synchronous and asynchronous updating, respectively. Rows show results for a constant mutational standard deviation s~0:05 (first and third rows)
and a constant mutational coefficient of variation CV~0:05 (second and fourth rows). Other parameters: T~15, N2~2,500, and m~0:02.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002660.g006
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‘‘gradual evolutionary decay of cooperation’’ in the well-mixed
model and ‘‘long term persistence of mutualism’’ in the spatially
structured model is restricted to the assumption that mutations
have a constant coefficient of variation (‘‘CV constant’’ in
Figure 6). Notably, our investigation reveals that relaxing this
assumption, by assuming constant and medium levels of muta-
tional variance, mutualism robustly evolves for all kinds of
populations structures and update rules (compare ‘‘CV constant’’
vs. ‘‘s constant’’ in Figure 6). We note here that our results are
qualitatively robust to changes of the number T of iterations
during the mutualistic interaction, which we have confirmed by
examining shorter (T~3) and longer (T~50) interactions instead
of T~15 (not shown). Fifth, we demonstrate that below a
threshold level of mutational variability no stable levels of
mutualistic investments evolve in the community, and this
threshold is considerably lower for higher benefit-to-cost ratios
and for spatially structured populations (Figure 2A). In summary,
we conclude that spatial population structure has a beneficial effect
on the evolution of stable high interspecific investment levels, but
this effect is only apparent for constant CV , for small mutational
variability, and for small benefit-to-cost ratios. By changing these
conditions, mutualism can be stable both in well-mixed and in
spatially structured communities.
Finally, our results enable us to understand the mechanisms
underlying the evolution and stability of mutualism in greater depth.
In particular, we can highlight several new mechanisms for
stabilizing mutualism, both in well-mixed and spatially structured
populations. First and foremost, we have presented the investment
cycle (Figure 1), which drives the main coevolutionary dynamics of
traits, and underlies the evolution of cooperative investments levels
in mutualist communities. While the cyclic dynamics can already be
seen in DK’s results (e.g., in their Figure 2), here we have put it into
the spotlight of our analysis. Second, we have demonstrated the
spreading of the investment cycle phases, and have revealed the
diverse ways strategies interact when they are in different phases,
both within and between mutualist guilds (see Figure 2 and Figure 5).
Thus, in contrast to the interpretation of DK, that mutualism is
maintained by a balance between the ‘‘continual reoccurrence of
mutualistic types’’ and then a ‘‘gradual evolutionary decay of
cooperation’’ (DK), we show that mutualism is mainly stabilized by
phase polymorphism along the investment cycle (Figures 2, 3, and
4). The emerging phase polymorphism and underlying strategy
diversity recurrently retrigger evolutionarily increasing levels of
cooperative investments in some portion of the community (phase I
in Figure 3A, B), a process that is essential for maintaining high
investment levels. Third, while DK already noticed ‘‘considerable
genetic heterogeneity,’’ here we have demonstrated the existence of
sharp diversity thresholds. In addition, we can provide an
explanation for the differences in the stability of mutualism under
constant CV vs. constant s, as well as under low s vs. high s. These
differences derive from the fact that if phase polymorphism is largely
lost, it is much harder to retrigger the investment cycle (by attaining
trait combinations above bT) once the community has reached the
last phase of the investment cycle (or in other words, once phase I
has vanished from the community). For similar reasons, any
mechanism that prevents or counteracts the generation of phase
polymorphism will increase the chances of losing mutualism.
Whereas DK suggested that ‘‘for mutualism to evolve,… spatial
structure… is required,’’ here we have reversed that logic, by
clarifying that strategy diversity and phase polymorphism along the
investment cycle are responsible for maintaining high investment
levels and that the only effect of spatial structure is to enhance this
polymorphism. Fourth, we have studied spatial mosaic dynamics by
analyzing replacement dynamics in the mutualist populations to
understand why spatial structure increases polymorphism (Figure 5).
Combining our insights with DK’s intuitive concept of the ‘‘boiling
Figure 7. Schematic representation of mutualistic interactions in (A) monomorphic and (C) polymorphic mutualist communities.
Spheres depict strategies, and the links between spheres represent the interactions between interacting strategies from the two mutualist guilds. (B)
According to its own and its partner’s strategy, an individual receives a payoff (schematically illustrated by two triangles that become darker and
wider as the received payoff increases). The comparison of payoffs between partners shows whether their interaction is more mutualistic (middle) or
more exploitative (bottom and top). (D) Average distribution of interaction types in our model, showing that small relative differences D between the
payoffs of interacting individuals are more common or longer-lasting than extreme exploitations. (E) Average distribution of the payoff sums and
relative payoff differences for interacting individuals of Mutualist A and Mutualist B, demonstrating that, on average, payoffs in asymmetric, or
exploitative, interactions are lower than in symmetric, or more mutualistic, interactions. The distributions in D and E are based on sampling all
individuals in every 100th generation for 100,000 generations and for five replicate model runs. The relative difference between the payoffs Pi,j and
Pj,i of individuals i and j is given by D~(Pi,j{Pj,i )=(Pi,jzPj,i), and 2Pmax is given by 2TB0 . Parameters: N
2~2,500, T~15, B0~7, B1~2:5, C0~0:1,
CV~0:05, and m~0:02.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002660.g007
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sea of mutualistic bubbles,’’ our investigation reveals the complex
dynamics among bubbles and the key role of the insulating
boundary layer in preserving polymorphism in spatially structured
populations. Fifth, this enables us to understand why asynchronous
updating makes mutualism less stable, as it more easily shatters
insulating boundaries, promotes asymmetric and uncoupled inva-
sion of the two mutualists among bubbles, and hence makes the
homogenization of bubbles more likely. Sixth, while our results
explain why spatial structure is helpful in maintaining mutualism,
they also demonstrate that space itself does not always suffice, and
neither always is necessary, to maintain community-level mutual-
ism.
Discussion
Here we have revealed several fundamentally new mechanisms
for the maintenance of interspecific cooperation. We show that
pairs of strategies evolve through investment cycles, which on their
own always result in full defection. Our analyses demonstrate,
however, that in both well-mixed and spatially structured
communities mutualisms can be perpetually stable if a strategy-
diversity threshold is exceeded and sufficient polymorphism is
generated and maintained in the community. In other words, such
a polymorphism of investment strategies is the main factor
stabilizing mutualism. Compared to the well-mixed case, a lower
amount of variation suffices to maintain mutualism in spatially
structured populations; we have shown that this is because of
insulating boundary layers that promote polymorphism by
preserving spatial bubbles of matched mutualistic strategies. Our
findings underscore that mutualism is not always a stationary
outcome, but may involve a polymorphism of investment levels
that vary both in space and in time (Figure 7).
Importance of polymorphism
Our analysis has shown that when our model community
exhibits a stable mean level of mutualism, it is invariably
characterized by a high degree of polymorphism, and that
mutualism persists only if this polymorphism is maintained.
Without strategy polymorphism, the evolutionarily stable state of
the system is a community consisting only of full defectors (no
investment). This is because full defection is the best response to
itself, and no mutant investing more can spread in either species
[53]. No other strategy pairs are best responses to each other, so
there are no other evolutionarily stable states. However, there are
many pairs of strategies that can spread in initially non-mutualistic
populations (Figure 1); above a threshold of reciprocating
investments, evolution guides these strategies through an invest-
ment cycle, which eventually always results in no investment.
Hence, mutualistic investments in our model are fundamentally
unstable [56], never reaching finite stable levels even though they
may initially be increasing. This means that in our model
evolution without strategy polymorphism can only temporarily
lead to high mutualistic investments before these eventually
collapse again.
Similar dynamics have been observed in studies investigating the
evolution of intraspecific cooperative investments in different game-
theoretical models. For example, in the prisoner’s dilemma game
with discrete reactive strategies [4,57], the Tit-for-Tat strategy
(TFT) can oust the always-defect strategy (All-D), but the always-
cooperate strategy (All-C) can spread in a population adopting TFT,
which in turn enables invasion by All-D. As mentioned in the
Results section, TFT is similar to strategies with high conditional
investments b in our model, whereas All-C is similar to strategies
with dominating unconditional investments a. Without the contin-
uous reestablishment of strategies by mutations, models with
discrete strategies may also end up in a fully defective state [4,57].
In contrast to these results for communities with low degrees of
polymorphism, when sufficient polymorphism is generated,
community-level mutualism becomes stable. For this to happen,
the degree of polymorphism needs to exceed a threshold
(Figure 2A). Even in well-mixed populations, stochastic symmetry
breaking in the interactions, combined with phase polymorphism
along the investment cycle, leads to the emergence of a high
variety of strategy pairings and payoffs (Figure 3B, C). While
evolution drives individual strategy pairs toward exploitation (and,
ultimately, to zero investment), the exploited partner has a fitness
disadvantage: consequently, the highly exploitative pairs are
replaced by more mutualistic pairs, which show less asymmetry
in their payoffs (Figure 3C). These pairs are typically composed of
strategies from phase I of the investment cycle (Figure 3). Our
findings thus indicate that the interspecific interactions exist in a
state of permanent flux, fluctuating between different investment
levels at the individual level. In contrast, the mean level of
mutualistic investment remains positive (and for high degrees of
polymorphism becomes stable), shaped by a balance between two
components of selection: strategy evolution along the investment
cycle and replacement of overly exploited strategies and of
mismatched strategy pairs.
Spatial population structure further facilitates the stability of
mutualism by playing a key role in supporting polymorphism
(Figure 4 and 5). However, limited dispersal and localized
interaction alone do not maintain mutualism, but only when they
work together with mutational variance that is high enough to
sustain a critical level of polymorphism (Figure 2A). In spatially
structured populations, the interaction among emerging, invading,
and collapsing spatial bubbles of strategy pairs creates a dynamic
spatial mosaic, by means of which different phases of the
investment cycle are distributed among bubbles. As a result of
this phase spread, the evolutionary dynamics of mutualistic
investments become decoherent among the different bubbles.
This is called phase diffusion, which in general occurs when
stochastic drift reduces correlations among the cycle phases of
subsystems (here the spatial bubbles) comprising a system (here the
full community). Consequently, among bubbles, the community
shows a wide but stable range of interaction types along the
mutualism–exploitation continuum (Figure 7D). We have shown
how mechanisms operating at the interface of these bubbles
effectively prevent the spatial homogenization of strategies across
the community by creating insulating boundary layers (Figure 4B
and 5D) that in turn sustain the spatial mosaic structure of bubbles
together with the implied strategy polymorphism. We emphasize
here that the mechanism of spatial population dynamics and
interaction between neighboring bubbles described here funda-
mentally differs from previously described roles of spatial structure
in models of intraspecific cooperation (in which, in a nutshell,
cooperation is maintained by the clustering of cooperators and by
their spatial segregation from defectors [49]).
Complexity of mutualisms in nature
One implication of our study is that the diversity of mutualistic
strategies in natural communities may be high not only because of
mutation and recombination, or inherent species diversity, but also
as a product of selection pressures resulting from the complex
dynamics of mutualistic interactions occurring within polymorphic
mutualist guilds. We note here that, based on our model
assumptions, the two mutualist populations may correspond not
only to single species interacting pairwise, but also to two
interacting mutualist guilds [58], that is, a collection of species
Mutualism with Investment Cycles and Polymorphism
PLOS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 11 November 2012 | Volume 8 | Issue 11 | e1002660
with the same function in mutually beneficial ecological interac-
tions. Thus, strategy polymorphism in our model can relate not
only to variation within, but also across, species. Indeed, growing
empirical evidence suggests that polymorphisms of mutualistic
investment strategies are common in nature [19,21,22,27,34,58–
66], even on small spatial scales [67,68]. Many studies suggest that
microbial populations and communities are often structurally and
genetically more diverse [67,69], considering both type or strain
richness and/or genetic diversity [68], than what can be explained
by local host diversity [70]. Also the effectiveness of rhizobia, such
as their ability to form nodules and their capacity to fix nitrogen,
varies greatly within species, and naturally, between species
[27,58,71,72]; similar conclusions hold for the performance of
mycorrhizal interactions [26,65,73]. This diversity amounts to a
high variety of investment strategies; in other words, less
mutualistic types coexist with more beneficial mutualists in natural
communities [6,19,21,22,27,34,36,71].
Mutualistic interactions are known to shift along the mutual-
ism–exploitation continuum in response to changes in environ-
mental factors [7,19,58,59,74,75]. For example, many nutritional
mutualisms, including mycorrhizal or rhizobial mutualisms [13],
are highly beneficial for host plants as long as the resource
provided (e.g., phosphorus, nitrogen, or copper) is absent from the
environment, but can become harmful (implying that costs exceed
benefits) when that resource no longer is a limiting factor
[2,38,19,76]. This not only underscores the importance of reactive
strategies for modeling mutualism, but also offers one explanation
for the spatial mosaic structures observed that involve different
genotypes, as well as the different local coevolutionary states
shaped by different local selective forces [45,65,77–79]. Our
findings highlight that spatial environmental heterogeneity is not
required for the creation of such mosaics, as the mechanisms
unraveled here provide a testable alternative explanation of these
empirical observations, even in the complete absence of spatial
environmental heterogeneity.
Mutualisms can also be unstable on a much longer time scale,
and there can be a diversity of mutualistic, parasitic, and free-
living variants within higher taxa. The phylogenetic analysis of
mycorrhizal and free-living homobasidiomycetes suggests that
there have been several transformations between symbiotic and
free-living forms [80]. The gain and loss of mutualistic traits thus
seems to be relatively common on an evolutionary time scale, a
finding that is in good agreement with our model-based results.
Limitations
The model by Doebeli and Knowlton [43] has been criticized for
being applicable only to organisms with high cognitive abilities [13].
Yet it has been demonstrated that even the simplest unicellular
organisms are capable of complex reactive behavior. For example, it
has been shown that, in response to the concentration of received
nutrients and synthesized products, hosts and symbionts can control
their exchange of material simply by controlling fluxes through their
various metabolic pathways [31], regulating and operating proteins
[29,81], or inducing structural changes at the host–symbiont
interface [28,82]. Such adjustments closely resemble the reactive,
conditional nature of interspecific cooperative investments, as
captured by the model we have analyzed here.
However, there are assumptions in our model that can and
should be relaxed and modified in subsequent studies. For
example, in the model studied here, one individual always
interacts with only one partner. Yet, in the majority of examples
in nature, one host can interact with several symbionts at the same
time, and vice versa [12,13,27]. The square grid we have
considered here might be suitable if both mutualists have limited
dispersal and are thus spatially confined. Of course, one or both
partners can be more motile, without well-mixed populations
being the immediate result. Moreover, different interaction
topologies could be considered, such as small-world or scale-free
networks. Finally, partners in the current model have similar life
cycles, which might apply only to a very limited number of
biological examples; thus, assuming life-cycle asymmetries could
be an important extension of the current model [43].
Outlook
Our study has shown that the community-level picture of
mutualism can be quite different from that at the individual level.
As the mean outcome can provide misleading or poor information,
a full understanding of the involved ecological and evolutionary
dynamics requires an appreciation of the distribution of outcomes
[40]. In line with various recent studies, we have demonstrated
that mutually beneficial interspecific interactions should not be
conceived only as (z,z) interactions, but as a continuous range of
symmetrically beneficial (z,z), asymmetrically beneficial (z,0),
and explicitly exploitative or parasitic (z,{) interactions [36]
(Figures 3 and 7). Our results thus suggest that it is not enough to
monitor average fitness advantages, as localized individual
interactions may be situated at different points along the
mutualism–parasitism continuum (Figure 7), and may also shift
in time. The long-standing notion of mutualistic interactions being
static is thus becoming extended as new findings, both experi-
mental and theoretical, broaden our understanding. Consequent-
ly, exploitation and mutualism are not always strictly separate
types of interactions, but in many instances may serve as
boundaries of a continuous distribution of interactions between
two mutualist guilds. This distribution reflects not only population
or guild-level variation, but also dynamical changes of interactions
occurring on ecological and evolutionary time scales.
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